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GENE THERAPY’S FIELD OF DREAMS: IF YOU 
BUILD IT, WILL WE PAY?* 
LAURA HERCHER** & ANYA E.R. PRINCE*** 
Long overpromised and underdelivered, gene therapy has at last 
achieved clinical validation and, with the advent of improved 
gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR, seems poised to play 
a rapidly expanding role in medical care. However, some of the 
intrinsic qualities of gene therapy pose a unique challenge to our 
health insurance model. Gene therapy is costly for a number of 
reasons. It is “personalized medicine,” which means that 
treatments are individualized and not for a broad audience. 
Additionally, the goal of gene therapy is to provide a one-time 
cure, so the cost is upfront and not spread over time as it would 
be with conventional drugs or therapeutics. As our experience to 
date illustrates, these issues of cost may adversely affect access. In 
this Article, we argue that a lack of broad access to gene therapy 
will deepen existing health inequities and may create a society of 
genetic haves and have-nots, where certain genetic diseases 
become something that happens only to those who cannot afford 
treatment. This in turn may increase stigma and decrease 
resources for affected individuals. For these reasons, the success 
of gene therapy must be considered as inextricable from issues of 
cost and coverage. 
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It’s amazing how many think [looming payment problems are] 
in the future .	.	.	. This is right now.1 
The future is already here—it’s just not very evenly distributed.2 
Gene-editing technologies bring the possibility of revolutionary 
advancements in clinical care through gene therapy and the possibility 
of realizing the long-imagined futuristic era of genomic medicine. 
Gene-therapy and gene-editing treatments carry not just a 
therapeutic goal but a curative goal—where patients’ symptoms are 
effectively cured through genetic changes. Yet a major concern with 
the introduction of gene editing into clinical care is whether access to 
these treatments will be evenly distributed in a health-care system 
that is by no means equitable. Lack of equitable access may result in a 
society where some are able to cure their genetic conditions before 
symptoms arise while others are “stuck” with curable genetic 
diseases—leading to disparities, lack of resources, and stigmatization. 
 
 1. Gina Kolata, New Gene-Therapy Treatments Will Carry Whopping Price Tags, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/health/cost-gene-
therapy-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/NPR6-WBHB (dark archive)].  
 2. The Future Has Arrived—It’s Just Not Evenly Distributed Yet, QUOTE 
INVESTIGATOR (Jan. 24, 2012), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/01/24/future-has-
arrived/ [https://perma.cc/VMF7-BRLF].  
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High costs and inequities of access are hardly unique to gene 
therapy, but these new treatment models, wildly expensive and 
resistant to economies of scale, threaten to bring the problem to a 
new level with profound societal implications. As several recent gene-
therapy treatments entering the market illustrate, these procedures 
have high price tags that challenge our current insurance system, 
especially as more gene-editing treatments become available for use 
and the number of patients seeking reimbursement grows.3 Although 
high-cost treatments are not uncommon in our health-care system, 
they are typically associated with treatments spread across months or 
years. Gene-editing treatments are often posited as a one-time event 
and as potential cures—meaning that companies providing these 
treatments must seek to recoup all of their investment in one fell 
swoop.4 
The questions are (1) whether and how the U.S. health insurance 
system will absorb the cost of these treatments, and (2) whether 
access will be available to many in society.5 Alternative payment 
structures have the potential to fulfill one or both of these goals—
lowering cost and increasing access. These goals are intertwined: 
lowering cost is likely to increase access and increasing access may 
lower cost. This Article argues that it is imperative that equitable 
access remain a cornerstone consideration in any discussion of gene 
therapy to avoid increased chasms between the haves and the have-
nots, the cured and those left without the ability to pay. 
Providing access to gene therapy may well require innovative 
approaches to pricing and reimbursement and may fundamentally 
alter the practice of insuring health care. Various alternative payment 
structures focus on different goals: some attempt to lower the overall 
cost of the treatments, whereas others spread the cost of gene therapy 
across time or broader risk pools.6 However, even if alternative 
payment structures can be developed to successfully provide 
reimbursement for gene-editing treatments, there is still no guarantee 
this will equate to widespread access. Payment issues, such as high co-
pays and other out-of-pocket costs, may be prohibitive for a 
significant portion of society even when insurers provide coverage for 
 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Section II.B. 
 5. See Bradley J. Fikes, Wave of Effective—and Expensive—Cell and Gene Therapies 
Challenges Health Insurers, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Oct. 4, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/biotech/sd-me-effective-expensive-cell-
therapies-20181004-story.html [https://perma.cc/ASC5-HSSV]. 
 6. See infra Section III.B. 
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the technology.7 Given the promise of cures for diseases, this prospect 
paints a worrisome picture of rising inequality of care. 
Our U.S. system of health care is rife with inequities of access. 
While high costs and the inability to pay for treatment are hardly 
problems unique to gene therapy, the promise of gene therapy to cure 
genetic diseases threatens to widen the breadth of our society’s health 
disparities and has the potential to decrease resources and social 
support for those left behind. We argue that a variety of alternative 
payment structures should be considered for gene-therapy 
treatments, focusing particularly on increasing equitable access to 
treatment both by increasing insurance coverage and by decreasing 
costs. 
It has not escaped our notice that this argument drives in the 
direction of a single-payer system.8 A single-payer health-care system 
would increase access to health care and therefore to approved gene 
therapy treatments across the board, thus making access to these 
technologies more equitable. It would also provide for greater 
bargaining power with treatment developers to employ various 
alternative payment structures.9 Indeed, the more we understand 
about the genetic causes of disease, the more a universal health-care 
system seems to make sense.10 The single-payer system, however, is 
by no means the “panacea” to the problems of cost identified here.11 
A focus on access that ignores the overall heightened cost of gene-
therapy treatments will threaten to bankrupt the system or drastically 
overspend limited government resources. Access, however, should 
not be forgotten as gene therapy is introduced into the market. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of 
how gene-editing treatments have been introduced into clinical care, 
including gene-editing treatments that use older technologies, as well 
 
 7. See infra Section III.C. 
 8. See, e.g., Grace Hampson et al., Gene Therapy: Evidence, Value and Affordability 
in the US Health Care System, 7 J. COMP. EFFECTIVENESS RES. 15, 18 (2018) (noting the 
difficulty of implementing alternative payment structures in a fragmented health-care 
system).  
 9. See, e.g., Fikes, supra note 5 (noting that single-payer systems are able to consider 
long-term benefits).  
 10. James P. Evans, Health Care in the Age of Genetic Medicine, 298 JAMA 2670, 
2670–72 (2007) (“The potential success of genomic medicine provides a series of 
additional compelling arguments to embrace a system of care that provides universal 
coverage and broadly pools risk. It is no small irony that the emergence of individualized 
medicine ultimately mandates a shared approach to health care delivery.”). 
 11. Id. at 2672. 
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as the prospect of similar treatments utilizing CRISPR.12 Part II 
discusses the primary cost drivers of gene-editing treatments—
namely, the limited market size of patients, the one-time nature of the 
treatment, and the patent system. Each of these factors helps to raise 
the cost of the treatments as companies must recoup their research 
and development costs among a small number of patients likely only 
paying for the procedure one time. 
Given the potential strain on the insurance system, Part III 
considers several alternative payment models that have been 
proposed for reimbursement of gene-editing treatments. While some 
of these may help ensure reimbursement for treatment, examples 
illustrate that the implementation of the payment structures can 
greatly affect both the success of the scheme and whether 
reimbursement will be accessible across populations. Finally, Part IV 
discusses how various elements of the U.S. health insurance system 
may lead to inequitable access to reimbursement for gene-editing 
treatments and, indeed, possibly to insurance itself. 
I.  GENE-EDITING TREATMENT AND EXPECTATIONS FOR CLINICAL 
USE 
Prospects for gene therapy have rebounded13 after a series of 
high-profile disasters dashed the great hopes associated with the field 
in the 1990s.14 Revitalized by improved viral and nonviral DNA 
delivery systems,15 gene therapy has expanded in the twenty-first 
 
 12. This Article focuses on cost and access to gene-editing treatments. The two 
common distinctions that arise when discussing gene editing are (1) whether changes will 
affect only the patient (i.e., only their somatic cells) or whether changes will alter the 
germline and may be passed down to potential future generations; and (2) whether the 
editing is occurring for treatment or enhancement. While there are ethical concerns, 
including issues of equitable access, to potential germline or enhancement gene editing, 
the Article has a narrower focus on somatic treatment. Given scientific complexities and 
ethical concerns, implementation of germline gene editing or enhancement in a clinical 
setting is unlikely to emerge as quickly as somatic gene editing—which is already being 
used in human clinical trials. 
 13. Samantha L. Ginn et al., Gene Therapy Clinical Trials Worldwide to 2017: An 
Update, J. GENE MED., Mar. 9, 2018, at 1, 3. 
 14. See Jennifer Couzin & Jocelyn Kaiser, As Gelsinger Case Ends, Gene Therapy 
Suffers Another Blow, 307 SCIENCE 1028, 1028 (2005); Tom Hollon, Researchers and 
Regulators Reflect on First Gene Therapy Death, 6 NATURE MED. 6, 6 (2000); Jian Qiao, 
Rosa Maria Diaz & Richard G. Vile, Success for Gene Therapy: Render unto Caesar That 
Which Is Caesar’s, 5 GENOME BIOLOGY 237.1, 237.1 (2004); Barbara Sibbald, Death but 
One Unintended Consequence of Gene-Therapy Trial, 164 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1612, 
1612 (2001).  
 15. See Pieter R. Cullis & Michael J. Hope, Lipid Nanoparticle Systems for Enabling 
Gene Therapies, 25 MOLECULAR THERAPY 1467, 1467 (2017) (discussing nonviral 
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century to include work on five continents, although as of 2017, the 
United States remains a driving force with over sixty-three percent of 
all gene-therapy trials.16 Gene therapy hit a series of milestones in 
2017, when treatments received Federal Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approval for use in the United States for the 
first time: Kymriah by Novartis in August to treat acute lymphoblastic 
leukemia,17 Yescarta by Kite Pharmaceuticals in October to treat B-
cell lymphoma,18 and Luxturna by Spark Therapeutics in December 
to treat a recessive form of retinal dystrophy stemming from the loss 
of both copies of a single gene.19 There are significant technical 
differences between the first two products and the last. The first two 
are so-called CAR-T cell therapies that involve removing, isolating, 
and manipulating the patient’s own T cells to provoke a specific 
immune response and then returning these cells through an infusion.20 
Luxturna, on the other hand, is delivered directly into the eye to alter 
retinal cells in vivo.21 All three treatments fit the current FDA 
definition of gene therapy as “a technique that modifies a person’s 
genes to treat or cure disease.”22 All of these early entrants into the 
 
delivery systems); Kenneth Lundstrom, Viral Vectors in Gene Therapy, DISEASES, May 21, 
2018, at 1, 1 (discussing viral delivery systems). 
 16. Ginn et al., supra note 13, at 6. 
 17. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the United 
States (Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Kymriah Press Release], https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm574058.htm [https://perma.cc/3JGZ-
2MLY].  
 18. See generally Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & 
Research, & Wilson W. Bryan, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, to Rizwana 
F. Sproule, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Kite Pharma, Inc. (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/CellularGeneTherapyProducts/A
pprovedProducts/UCM581259.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KSN-Q6XE] (discussing the 
approval of a license for Yescarta by Kite Pharmaceuticals). 
 19. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Novel Gene Therapy to Treat Patients with 
a Rare Form of Inherited Vision Loss (Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Luxturna Press 
Release], https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm589467.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TMZ3-5FW2]. 
 20. William F. Kaemmerer, How Will the Field of Gene Therapy Survive Its Success?, 
3 BIOENGINEERING & TRANSLATIONAL MED. 166, 166 (2018). 
 21. Id. 
 22. What Is Gene Therapy?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ucm573960.htm [https://perma.cc/X3JG-PLVR]. Others 
have argued for a new definition of gene therapy that is broad enough to include CAR-T 
treatment and applies to both in vivo and ex vivo treatments. See Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, Is It ‘Gene Therapy’?, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, Aug. 23, 
2018, at 1, 4. Kymriah, Yescarta and Luxturna utilize zinc-finger nucleases (“ZFNs”), as 
do the treatments for MPS I and II for which Sangamo Therapeutics was recently granted 
approval to begin human trials in Great Britain. ZFNs are enzymes that can be modified 
and utilized to target specific genetic sequences and were the most commonly used gene-
editing technique prior to the development of CRISPR. In August 2018, Vertex 
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gene-therapy marketplace were developed using older gene-editing 
systems and not the revolutionary CRISPR technology.23 
Improvements in the ease and efficiency with which we can edit 
DNA using CRISPR have generated sky-high expectations for 
breakthroughs in clinical care,24 expectations that have manifested 
themselves materially as a thriving new market sector. According to 
Forbes, there are now three publicly traded “CRISPR companies” 
with a combined market capitalization of more than three billion 
dollars.25 Each of the three tripled their stock price in the twelve-
month period leading up to June 201826—this to fund translational 
research using the gene-editing technique that did not exist prior to 
2012. 
Many of the bold-faced names credited with the discovery of 
CRISPR and the development of techniques for its use in organisms 
more complicated than a bacterial cell, including human cells, have 
become partners in commercial ventures to develop and bring to 
market clinical applications of the technology. George Church and 
Feng Zhang are scientific advisors and co-founders of Editas, which 
received FDA approval in late 2018 for human trials of a treatment 
for Leber congenital amaurosis, a genetic disorder that primarily 
affects the eye.27 This would be the first in vivo use of a CRISPR-
derived medication.28 Editas also reports that it is conducting 
preclinical studies of treatments for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
cystic fibrosis, β-thalassemia and alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency.29 
 
Pharmaceuticals and CRISPR Therapeutics opened enrollment in Germany in a study 
combining phase 1 and phase 2 clinical trials for β-thalassemia; this will be the first-ever 
human trial of a CRISPR-based gene therapy. Catherine Offord, US Companies Launch 
CRISPR Clinical Trial, SCIENTIST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-
opinion/us-companies-launch-crispr-clinical-trial-64746 [https://perma.cc/594F-MMJ4]. 
 23. In-Young Jung & Jungmin Lee, Unleashing the Therapeutic Potential of CAR-T 
Cell Therapy Using Gene-Editing Technologies, 41 MOLECULES & CELLS 717, 717, 721 
(2018); Morgan L. Maeder et al., Development of a Gene-Editing Approach to Restore 
Vision Loss in Leber Congenital Amaurosis Type 10, 25 NATURE MED. 229, 229 (2019). 
 24. Kaemmerer, supra note 20, at 166–67. 
 25. Robert Glatter, How CRISPR Gene Editing Is Revolutionizing Medicine and the 
Companies Who Invest in It, FORBES (June 25, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/robertglatter/2018/06/25/how-crispr-gene-editing-is-revolutionizing-medicine-and-the-
companies-who-invest-in-it/#2a73f7b06f46 [https://perma.cc/MWF2-WZKQ]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Editas Medicine, Inc., IPO BOUTIQUE, https://www.ipoboutique.com/
0605Advisories/EDIT.htm [https://perma.cc/QYB5-BC4Y]. 
 28. Press Release, Editas Med. Inc., Editas Medicine Announces FDA Acceptance of 
IND Application for EDIT-101 (Nov. 30, 2018), http://ir.editasmedicine.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/editas-medicine-announces-fda-acceptance-ind-application-edit 
[https://perma.cc/BKP8-FXZF]. 
 29. See Editas Medicine, Inc., supra note 27. 
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Jennifer Doudna and Rodolphe Barrangou are co-founders and 
scientific advisors at Intellia Therapeutics,30 which has touted its late-
stage preclinical work on gene therapy for sickle cell disease31 and has 
a partnership with Regeneron aimed at developing a treatment for 
transthyretin amyloidosis.32 Emmanuelle Charpentier is a founder 
and Scientific Advisory Board member of CRISPR Therapeutics,33 
which has been granted “Fast Track Designation” from the FDA for 
human application of its sickle cell therapy.34 Like the β-thalassemia 
study in Germany, these therapies will modify and return isolated 
blood stem cells to the blood stream in an attempt to provide the cells 
with a functioning hemoglobin gene that will compensate for the 
defective version associated with both diseases.35 
Overall, these trials illustrate progress in the development of 
gene therapy, including therapies using CRISPR technologies, which 
are likely to continue.36 As the next part discusses, several market 
 
 30. Leadership, INTELLIA THERAPEUTICS, https://www.intelliatx.com/overview/
leadership/ [https://perma.cc/8PSA-UEMS].  
 31. See Press Release, Intellia Therapeutics, Inc., Intellia Therapeutics Announces 
New, Robust Genome Editing Data for Sickle Cell Disease at the American Society of 
Hematology Meeting (Dec. 11, 2017), https://ir.intelliatx.com/news-releases/news-release-
details/intellia-therapeutics-announces-new-robust-genome-editing-data-0 [https://perma.cc/
MQ8S-BLM4]. 
 32. Press Release, Regeneron Pharm., Inc., Regeneron and Intellia Therapeutics 
Announce Collaboration to Discover and Develop CRISPR/CAS Therapeutics (Apr. 11, 
2016, 4:05 PM), https://newsroom.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/
regeneron-and-intellia-therapeutics-announce-collaboration [https://perma.cc/YJD7-C9EB]. 
 33. Leadership: Dr. Emmanuelle Charpentier, CRISPR THERAPEUTICS, 
http://www.crisprtx.com/about-us/leadership/dr-emmanuelle-charpentier [https://perma.cc/
VFR8-NMB6]. 
 34. Press Release, CRISPR Therapeutics, CRISPR Therapeutics and Vertex 
Announce FDA Fast Track Designation for CTX001 for the Treatment of Sickle Cell 
Disease (Jan. 4, 2019), http://ir.crisprtx.com/node/8556/pdf [https://perma.cc/KQG5-
PBH3]. 
 35. Offord, supra note 22. 
 36. Notwithstanding all this rapid progress, technical challenges persist that may 
complicate the in vivo use of CRISPR technologies. See Carsten T. Charlesworth et al., 
Identification of Pre-Existing Adaptive Immunity to Cas9 Proteins in Humans, 25 NATURE 
MED. 249, 249 (2019) (suggesting that a majority of people may harbor preexisting 
antibodies to Cas9, an enzyme that plays an integral role in the most common version of 
the CRISPR gene-editing system); Michael Kosicki, Kärt Tomberg & Allan Bradley, 
Repair of Double-Strand Breaks Induced by CRISPR–Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and 
Complex Rearrangements, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 765, 765 (2018) (reporting an 
unexpectedly high number of problematic genetic changes, such as large deletions and 
structural rearrangements, following the use of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing in mouse cell 
lines). Such challenges have reanimated concerns about gene therapy, causing 
malignancies which have troubled the field from its earliest days. See Sam Sherratt, DNA 
Damage from CRISPR ‘Seriously Underestimated’, BIONEWS (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_137304 [https://perma.cc/TA29-E5Y9]. For example, in 
2002, an apparently successful trial of gene therapy for immunodeficiency was shut down 
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forces drive costs of these treatments upwards. While increasing 
utilization of gene-therapy treatments could be beneficial to targeted 
patient populations, how the health-care system will absorb the cost 
of the growing number of treatments is currently unclear. 
II.  GENE EDITING AND COST DRIVERS 
As gene-editing treatments continue to rapidly gain regulatory 
approval and be introduced into the clinical market, greater focus 
must be given to the impact this will have on insurance and the 
downstream implications for access to the treatments.37 The cost of 
gene-editing therapies is likely to be a major barrier for many patients 
in need of treatment and will create challenges for pharmaceutical 
companies, payers, and patients. While most gene-editing treatments 
are still in development or available only through clinical trials, the 
handful of gene-therapy products that have received approval for 
commercial use are illustrative of the ways in which gene therapy is 
inherently an awkward fit for our current model of health-care 
reimbursement. As discussed above, none of these approved 
therapies use CRISPR, but while the gene-editing system may 
change, the issues remain the same.38 Each of the therapies 
introduced to date highlight specific challenges for gene-editing 
treatments to come. An overarching theme is that high costs of the 
treatments are likely to stretch the existing insurance reimbursement 
 
when two of the eleven children treated became ill with leukemia. Donald B. Kohn, 
Michel Sadelain & Joseph C. Glorioso, Occurrence of Leukemia Following Gene Therapy 
of X-Linked SCID, 3 NATURE REVIEWS CANCER 477, 477 (2003); Charles Marwick, FDA 
Halts Gene Therapy Trials After Leukaemia Case in France, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 181, 181 
(2003). However, prevailing sentiment is that these are obstacles rather than roadblocks 
and that workarounds or alternate strategies will emerge. See Expert Reaction to Study 
Looking at Deletions and Rearrangements Due to the CRISPR/Cas9 Genome Editing 
Technique, SCI. MEDIA CTR. (July 16, 2018), http://www.sciencemediacentre.org/expert-
reaction-to-study-looking-at-deletions-and-rearrangements-due-to-the-crispr-cas9-genome-
editing-technique/ [https://perma.cc/LEZ8-E3PX]; Julianna LeMieux, Another “CRISPR 
Calamity”? U.K. Team Reports CRISPR-Induced Gene Rearrangements, GEN (July 16, 
2018), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/another-crispr-calamity-uk-team-reports-
crispr-induced-gene-rearrangements/77901116 [https://perma.cc/627F-SECF].  
 37. Incentives and the cost of research and development of preclinical care also 
greatly impact the cost of gene-therapy treatments. Changes to innovation and regulatory 
approval could have the potential to lower costs for society. For example, either changes 
to how research is funded or a more streamlined regulatory process could potentially 
lower research and development costs to companies—thus lowering costs to patients. 
However, such policy recommendations are beyond the scope of this Article, which 
focuses on how payers will address costs once introduced to market given that near-term 
treatments are likely to continue to be expensive unless and until innovation policy 
changes. 
 38. See infra Part II. 
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system.39 These high costs are driven by: (1) market challenges for 
pharmaceutical companies due to limited patient populations,40 (2) 
one-time treatments,41 and (3) a patent system that purposefully 
imposes monopolies into the market in order to allow pharmaceutical 
companies to recoup their research and development costs.42 
A. Restricted Market Size 
Developing a drug for a small patient population requires a 
higher price tag per treatment to recoup the cost and return value to 
investors.43 As the prices are pushed upwards, the financial burden 
may become prohibitive, leaving patients without recourse to 
treatment. The small patient populations also make it difficult to 
develop the clinical evidence necessary to fully understand and 
document effectiveness44—an important consideration for payers 
deciding what to reimburse. 
For example, Glybera, developed by uniQure to treat the 
ultrarare disease lipoprotein lipase (“LPL”) deficiency, was the first 
gene therapy granted regulatory approval for the European market 
and debuted in 2012 with a price tag of approximately one million 
dollars per patient.45 The company argued that the high price tag was 
justified by a limited patient population, but it also served to restrict 
use of a drug already limited by a small potential audience. In fact, 
the clinical trials sponsored by the company treated over ten percent 
 
 39. See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 1. 
 40. See infra Section II.A. 
 41. See infra Section II.B. 
 42. See infra Section II.C. 
 43. See GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW & OFFICE 
OF HEALTH ECON., GENE THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE, ASSESSING THE 
EVIDENCE, AND PAYING FOR VALUE 26 (2017) [hereinafter ICER REPORT], https://icer-
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICER-Gene-Therapy-White-Paper-030317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8QZQ-ZT77]; Stuart H. Orkin & Philip Reilly, Paying for Future 
Success in Gene Therapy, 352 SCIENCE 1059, 1060 (2016). Of course, a treatment’s price is 
not only based on the past research costs but also on willingness to pay and other 
economic assessments. See David R. Carr & Steven E. Bradshaw, Gene Therapies: The 
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of the entire potential European patient population.46 Of the rest, 
only a single patient went on to receive treatment.47 
Having spent over 100 million dollars bringing the drug to 
market, uniQure hoped to recoup its investment by expanding to the 
United States, but when the FDA demanded further trials as well as 
long-term follow-up, the company decided to cut its losses and 
withdraw from FDA review.48 UniQure also allowed its European 
approval to lapse in 2017.49 Though Glybera provided proof that gene 
therapy could work and that regulators were open to approving its 
use, the drug was a commercial failure.50 
The problems that beset Glybera are not specific to LPL 
deficiency. Cancer immunotherapy aside, the principal targets for 
gene therapy to date have been Mendelian diseases—diseases where 
a single gene is the target.51 Genetic diseases are individually rare if 
collectively common, offering many potential targets for gene therapy 
but few with blockbuster potential. Small audiences are the inherent 
flip side of individualized treatment because the whole premise of 
“individualizing” treatment is to make a smaller, more targeted 
market. This obviously applies to rare and ultrarare diseases, but even 
in the case of more common diseases, genetic medicine often targets 
specific genetic changes that make up a subset of the disease or 
specific disease mechanisms, limiting its effectiveness to a slice of the 
affected population. Some recent targeted therapies from the drug-
development world illustrate this pattern. Ivacaftor, a breakthrough 
medication for cystic fibrosis (“CF”), is an effective cure but only for 
three to four percent of the CF population.52 The FDA approved 
Eteplirsen for Duchenne muscular dystrophy in 2016 but only for 
those with a specific genetic mutation, an estimated thirteen to 
 
 46. See Antonio Regalado, The World’s Most Expensive Medicine Is a Bust, MIT 
TECH. REV. (May 4, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601165/the-worlds-most-
expensive-medicine-is-a-bust [https://perma.cc/S8CC-VSD3]. 
 47. ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 20; Ben Hirschler, Biotech Firm Pulls Pioneering 
Gene Therapy Due to No Demand, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2017, 11:19 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-gene-therapy-uniqure/biotech-firm-pulls-pioneering-
gene-therapy-due-to-no-demand-idUSKBN17M1WI [https://perma.cc/T2YN-CZZ7]. 
 48. Regalado, supra note 46. There were also some questions as to the effectiveness of 
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fourteen percent of affected boys.53 These examples of a limited 
audience are not exceptions but rather are the very nature of 
personalized medicine. 
The potential inability to recoup costs discourages 
pharmaceutical companies from researching treatments for rare 
diseases. Legislation has attempted to address some of the issues 
surrounding rare disease development in the past. For example, 
federal law incentivizes companies to develop pharmaceuticals for 
rare diseases when it might not be financially feasible to invest in the 
research and development costs.54 Yet this only solves part of the 
problem, since the newly developed treatments can still be expensive. 
Therefore, some have argued that a portion of these funds could be 
diverted towards lowering the cost of the therapies for the patient.55 
Over time, greater expertise may allow us to simplify the 
development of therapeutics or the process of obtaining regulatory 
approval, but for the foreseeable future, the costs involved with 
bringing a treatment to market will remain formidable relative to the 
potential audience. This suggests that prices will remain high and, in 
some cases, prohibitive. 
B. One-Time Therapy Versus Lifetime Costs 
The initial price tag for Kymriah, the first gene therapy approved 
by the FDA,56 was $475,000.57 Although undeniably expensive, it 
compares well with the cost of existing therapies in those cases where 
it is either a cure or a long-term solution. This is, however, only true 
where the therapy forestalls further treatment. When it does not, it is 
a significant added expense. 
In December 2017, four months after Kymriah was approved, 
Luxturna became the third gene-therapy treatment approved by the 
FDA and the first gene therapy approved to be administered directly 
into a patient.58 Luxturna was approved as a treatment for an 
inherited form of vision loss and blindness that affects between 1000 
to 2000 patients in the United States.59 Luxturna is also expensive, 
 
 53. FADY SHAWI, CHRISTINE PERRAS & MELISSA SEVERN, CADTH, EMERGING 
DRUGS FOR DUCHENNE MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY 4 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
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 54. 21 U.S.C. §§	360aa–360ee (2012). 
 55. Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at 1061. 
 56. FDA Kymriah Press Release, supra note 17. 
 57. Kolata, supra note 1. 
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 59. Id. 
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costing $850,000 per patient.60 Administered in two phases—one for 
each eye at $425,000 each—the treatment is a one-time deal. Given 
the lifetime costs of treatment and lost productivity related to 
disability, Luxturna may or may not be a good investment; the 
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review has argued that it is not.61 
But even assuming that it is, the economic analysis necessitates that it 
works as anticipated. Also, best-case scenario, Luxturna condenses a 
lifetime of costs into one very expensive month. One-time treatment 
is a common theme—and, indeed, often the raison d’etre—of gene-
therapy treatments. Gene-therapy treatments may drastically alter 
our medical and reimbursement systems because they have the 
potential to be one-time, curative treatments. However, for the same 
reason, a pharmaceutical company must recover all of its per-person 
investment in research, development, and cost of treatment from a 
single payment rather than spread them over time, as in the typical 
model of ongoing treatment or lifetime care. This will place a hefty 
initial burden on all insurers and government payers and create 
special challenges for most U.S. insurers, who have high rates of 
turnover as customers change jobs or policies and thus cannot 
amortize benefits of one-time cures over an extended period of time.62 
Justification for the high prices of drugs like Kymriah and 
Luxturna are often predicated on their value as a one-time treatment, 
but this may not be a realistic expectation in all cases. Effectiveness 
over a lifetime cannot be proven in advance since neither the 
manufacturers nor their patients are willing to wait a generation to 
test the hypothesis.63 In addition, approvals may be based on the 
economics of the best-case scenario, but in reality, the therapies are 
likely to be used more widely, including “off-label” use for patient 
populations that are a less perfect match than those considered under 
the regulatory process.64 Indeed, off-label uses of gene-therapy 
treatments utilizing CRISPR have been anticipated. For instance, the 
 
 60. Bill Berkrot, Spark’s Price for Luxturna Blindness Gene Therapy Too High: 
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 61. See id. 
 62. See infra text accompanying notes 77–79.  
 63. See ICER REPORT, supra note 43, at 18. 
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not approved by the Agency. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off 
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National Academy of Sciences report on genome editing gives the 
example of a treatment approved for adults that is expanded to a 
pediatric patient population through off-label use, although it notes 
that the extent of off-label use may be more limited than in the case 
of pharmaceuticals.65 
A potential problem with off-label uses from a reimbursement 
perspective is that it shifts the economic model justifying the cost of 
treatment. As the treatment is extended to other patient populations, 
it may be less effective, yet it likely carries the same price tag. An 
analogous example is the drug Kalydeco, which was developed as a 
treatment for the five percent of CF patients with a specific mutation 
in CFTR, the CF gene.66 The drug was effectively a cure in that 
population67 but had limited effectiveness for other CF patients who 
lacked this specific mutation. Nevertheless, many CF patients with 
other mutations clamored to use the expensive therapy to obtain 
whatever improvements in quality of life it afforded.68 Kalydeco, 
which costs $311,000 per year, is not a one-time treatment.69 But, like 
gene therapies, its high price tag is potentially justified by 
effectiveness and by the savings it generates by eliminating the need 
for more expensive ongoing therapy—a savings not seen when the 
expected therapeutic value falls short of full recovery. 
C. Patents 
Patents are another aspect of our medical system that can 
potentially drive up costs. Patents are provided to ensure that the 
research and development costs of a new treatment can be recouped 
through a period of market monopolization.70 With companies 
controlling patents for the newly developed treatments, there will 
likely not be market competition to help bring down the cost of gene-
editing treatments in the near future. Additionally, lack of market 
competition alters the motivations of the companies already holding 
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these patents, making them less willing to negotiate for the complex 
alternative payment systems, described below, because these systems 
will not give them an advantage over their (nonexistent) 
competitors.71 
The development costs for these new technologies is nothing to 
sniff at. One article estimated that it will take eight years and several 
hundred million dollars to develop a new gene therapy and obtain the 
necessary regulatory approval.72 Additionally, the patents provide a 
buffer for companies that can invest in a variety of potential 
treatments in case some do not thrive, like Glybera.73 There are 
ongoing patent fights over CRISPR technologies, but overall, the 
potential therapeutic market is controlled by a couple of players that 
have broad patents and are issuing surrogate licenses for other 
companies to use the patented technology in a particular space.74 
III.  ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
A. Payer Issues 
The high cost of gene-therapy treatments challenges the 
traditional U.S. reimbursement system. Although current medical 
care is replete with examples of expensive treatments and 
pharmaceuticals, gene-therapy treatments are somewhat unique in 
their elevated, one-time costs. It is unclear whether insurers will cover 
gene-therapy treatments across the board.75 Given the one-time high 
cost, insurers may exclude coverage of gene-therapy treatments 
altogether, or they may provide coverage for such technologies on a 
case-by-case basis.76 There are several reasons why insurers are 
disincentivized from providing coverage for such treatments. 
First, insurance policyholders may change their insurance 
coverage due to changes in employment, life situation, or geographic 
location. For example, the current median length of stay with an 
 
 71. See Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Private Sector Risk-Sharing Agreements in the 
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 72. Orkin & Reilly, supra note 43, at 1060. However, the authors of that article are 
affiliated with the industry, and therefore other estimates of research and development 
costs could conceivably be lower. 
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employer is 4.2 years,77 and since many Americans receive their 
insurance through their employers, they may switch insurers at that 
rate as well. Other individuals may switch between different specific 
insurance plans, switch plan options within their employer offerings at 
open enrollment, or shift from one type of insurance, such as 
Medicaid, to another, such as a private individual plan. Indeed, it is 
estimated that the average person stays with their medical insurance 
provider for “less than 6 years.”78 Given the distinct possibility that a 
current policyholder will no longer be a customer in a few years, a 
private insurer has little incentive to invest in treatments with long-
term benefits but immediate one-time costs in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.79 
Second, insurers may be less likely to cover therapies because 
there is a lack of evidence that the treatments will be successful long 
term.80 Gene-editing treatments come into the market with the 
promise and hope of lasting cures, but the technology is new enough 
that developers have not gathered data on a full generation of 
patients undergoing the treatment. Additionally, given the one-and-
done nature of the treatment, there is not an option to discontinue 
treatment that proves to be ineffective for the patient, as is the case 
for other expensive, but more long-term, treatments.81 The 
regulatory-approval process focuses on safety and analytical and 
clinical validity; however, to get approval, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate clinical utility.82 Thus, a treatment can enter the market 
as a safe product but run into barriers of reimbursement as insurers 
are wary of paying for untested technology.83 Without 
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reimbursement, treatments are more likely to go the way of Glybera 
and fail before ever really making it onto the market, despite crossing 
necessary regulatory hurdles and spending the initial research and 
development costs.84 
Third, even if insurers are interested in and willing to cover gene-
editing treatments, the reimbursement system may be overwhelmed 
by the upfront high cost of treatments.85 This is a foreseeable problem 
as the “ever-growing development pipeline of gene therapies on the 
horizon” begins to enter the market.86 Relatively conservative 
estimates of uptake of gene therapy show the impact of cost on the 
insurance system: 
Even if gene therapies are developed to treat only one in ten 
patients with a genetic condition—approximately 1% of the 
total US population—the cumulative budget impact at that 
price could rise to US$3 trillion, as much as is currently spent in 
a year on all health care in the USA.87 
Given that insurers may not be driven to cover these treatments 
or may be unable to afford them, the treatment developers will likely 
be motivated to find creative ways to obtain reimbursement. 
Kymriah’s introduction into the U.S. market provides an example of 
the developer’s willingness to think creatively about potential 
payment models. On the same day the FDA approved Kymriah, 
priced at $475,000, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) announced that it would work with stakeholders to explore 
“innovative payment arrangements.”88 The goal of innovating would 
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be to help pay for treatments that provide high patient value with a 
high one-time cost.89 Indeed, CMS has been a driver of exploring 
alternative payment structures as part of a broader increased focus on 
value-based medicine in lieu of fee-for-service care.90 Beyond just 
CMS, however, many different innovative pricing models have been 
introduced or suggested in the United States and internationally.91 
These pricing models range from financial agreements (such as 
discounts) to health-outcomes-based agreements (such as pay for 
performance).92 The models have been introduced across a wide 
variety of drugs and treatments but, in anticipation of the costs of 
gene therapy and gene editing, a number of these new pricing models 
have been suggested to ease the burden of covering gene-editing 
technologies.93 
B. Innovative Payment Models 
The goals of different payment schemes can be broadly 
categorized as lowering the costs of the therapy and expanding the 
insurance pool.94 Lowering costs will increase the likelihood that 
insurers will cover the treatment and that individuals can access the 
treatment. Absent lowering costs, expanding the pool spreads the 
high cost of care across a broader group, making it easier for 
insurance companies to absorb the cost into the system and, 
therefore, more likely that they will opt for coverage. As discussed 
above, sometimes insurers loathe covering expensive one-off 
treatment since the policyholder may not be a customer in a couple 
years.95 Spreading the risk of requests for high-cost gene-therapy 
coverage across a broader risk pool limits the impetus for insurers to 
avoid the difficulty associated with paying for coverage for 
policyholders possibly in transition. Three alternative payment 
structures—pay for performance, indication-based pricing, and 
discounts—primarily aim to lower the cost paid to the developer for 
the treatment.96 Annuities and reinsurance, on the other hand, 
primarily seek to spread the risk either temporally or across people 
and policies.97 
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This section discusses the five alternative payment structures 
mentioned above that have been implemented, discussed, or 
recommended in the context of expensive gene-therapy treatments: 
(1) pay for performance, (2) indication-based pricing, (3) discounts, 
(4) annuity payments, and (5) reinsurance. For example, the Institute 
for Clinical and Economic Review (“ICER”) identified these 
alternative structures as options for use in gene therapy at the 2016 
ICER Membership Policy Summit.98 This summit brought together 
representatives, including drug manufacturers, pharmacy benefit 
management, and insurers, to discuss various payment options.99 
Since then, there have been efforts to implement most of these 
alternative structures within a gene-therapy context, as will be 
discussed more below.100 
1.  Pay for Performance 
Pay-for-performance models, also called outcome-based or risk-
sharing models,101 require the patient, the payer, or both to pay the 
full cost of the treatment only if it is effective—thereby lowering the 
cost of the treatment for some individuals and for payers in the 
aggregate, while keeping the overarching list price high.102 There are 
several goals to setting up such a system. For one, insurers may be 
more likely to agree to cover a treatment when they are only paying 
for value.103 From a societal perspective, pay for performance would 
also be beneficial because it will ideally spur the collection of 
evidence of effectiveness and encourage the pharmaceutical 
community (or in this case the gene-therapy community) to focus on 
marketing to those populations where the drug or treatment is likely 
to be most effective. This raises two primary questions: What would 
the ongoing payment mechanism look like, and how will effectiveness 
be measured?104 
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Pay-for-performance models can either be set up where insurers 
buy the full cost of treatment up front and then receive rebates if the 
treatment is not effective long term.105 Alternatively, insurers could 
pay an initial amount and have some form of continuing payments for 
as long as the treatments work.106 One of the most difficult parts of 
this scenario is that it creates a long-term payment relationship 
between a treatment developer, the payer, and the patient for a single 
event that has already occurred. Thus, potential complications arise if 
and when the patient changes insurance companies.107 Does the new 
insurer now accept responsibility to pay for the remaining costs of a 
treatment they did not initially approve or cover? Does the old 
insurance company continue to have an obligation to cover costs for a 
patient who is no longer their policyholder? If the insurer is expecting 
rebates, how do they continue to track the health of a patient who is 
no longer their policyholder? It is perhaps no wonder that many 
examples of implemented pay-for-performance contracts have arisen 
in countries with single-payer systems, where this problem of 
switching insurance plans does not arise.108 
A rebate may be the best way to address this scenario, especially 
if the treatment developer assesses performance across a patient 
population rather than for a specific patient.109 Thus, the relevant data 
would be the aggregate success of a treatment rather than data 
particular to one patient—a situation that would also encourage 
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broad data collection on effectiveness of the treatment overall.110 
Another potential solution is to place the initial payment into a type 
of escrow account until the success of the drug has been 
determined.111 If it does not succeed, as defined by the parties, the 
payer will get the money back from escrow.112 If it does succeed, the 
manufacturer will get the money.113 Although this would address 
many of the back-end challenges of long-term follow-up, it would not 
ease the initial payments made by payers and therefore may still lead 
payers to opt not to cover the expensive treatment due to high 
upfront costs. 
As discussed previously, the pay-for-performance model has 
already made a brief debut in the U.S. gene-therapy markets when 
CMS announced its willingness to develop an alternative payment 
model for Kymriah.114 This first attempt showed little promise, since 
less than one year after the initial announcement CMS ended 
negotiations over the payment deal, ostensibly out of concern that 
Novartis, the maker of Kymriah, had too much influence over the 
negotiations.115 
This raises the second major question of a pay-for-performance 
model: How and when should effectiveness be measured?116 During 
the CMS negotiations for Kymriah, Novartis advocated for an 
assessment of effectiveness one month after treatment.117 Others 
argued that this was too short a time period to properly measure 
success or to determine if there will be any complications or adverse 
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events.118 There is a balance, however, to selecting an appropriate 
time frame to measure the outcomes of a treatment. Shorter time 
frames are generally recommended for pay-for-performance systems, 
since longer time frames increase the administrative costs and 
complexity of implementing the model.119 Of course, too short of time 
frames may not convince payers that a treatment is truly successful 
and therefore will not be successful in bringing gene therapies to 
market. 
To be successful, pay for performance should incorporate 
relatively easy-to-measure outcomes.120 These should be “objective, 
clearly defined, reproducible, .	.	. difficult to manipulate,” and not 
influenced by other situations or patient characteristics.121 Gene 
therapy specifically, however, may not have easy-to-measure 
outcomes available. As one commentary discussing the challenges of 
alternative payment models describes:  
[U]nlike hypertension whereby reduction in blood pressure is 
an easy to understand end point for an antihypertensive and 
could be used in a pay-for-performance .	.	.	, there are 
difficulties in demonstrating outcomes via hard end points in 
genetic diseases, even on a patient level as population studies 
are difficult given the small numbers, and there is also the 
additional time lag (sometimes years) between administration 
and any apparent clinical benefit.122 
Additionally, since each gene-therapy treatment is unique, the 
outcomes assessment will need to be renegotiated between 
developers and payers for each new treatment.123 
These complications of negotiating pay-for-performance models 
have led to fairly low and stagnant uptake of these types of 
agreements in the private sector across a variety of treatments.124 
Gene therapy has increased calls for implementation of pay for 
performance in this area, but it remains to be seen whether the 
private sector will increasingly negotiate these arrangements. 
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2.  Indication-Based Pricing 
When a drug is introduced into the market, it may be prescribed 
for a number of different conditions, whether on or off label.125 
However, the drug is likely to have different levels of effectiveness, 
especially when the conditions, or indications, are quite different.126 
This variable effectiveness across different patient populations is 
behind original calls for indication-based pricing. Under indication-
based pricing, the most effective uses of the treatment cost more than 
those uses that have less effectiveness.127 The economic motivations 
for patients paying more for those treatments that provide higher 
value is that, by successfully segmenting patient markets, access to the 
drug will increase across patient populations.128 The lower costs for 
some segments of the population will make it more likely that they 
can access treatment.129 This method, however, has been criticized, 
with those against the practice arguing that this will not lower costs 
but increase health-care spending through greater utilization of less 
effective treatments.130 
Indication-based pricing was utilized for Kymriah in the gene-
therapy context.131 About a year after its initial approval, the FDA 
gave Kymriah a new approval, expanding it from a therapy intended 
only for young adults and children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia 
to a treatment for large B-cell lymphoma in all patients, including 
adults.132 The cost of the same drug for this different patient 
population is $373,000, compared to the original $475,000.133 Whether 
this type of pricing will increase access to helpful treatment or simply 
increase utilization of less effective treatments remains to be seen. 
3.  Discounts 
A third way to lower the cost of treatments is, well, to lower the 
cost of treatments. Drug manufacturers have utilized discounts or 
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rebates as a way to increase uptake of a pharmaceutical product by 
charging a lower price tag than the list price of the good.134 In the 
context of gene-therapy treatments, developers may opt to provide 
discounts to certain patients or a specific insurance plan in order to 
encourage uptake and coverage.135 Discounts can be beneficial 
because they lower the cost of the treatment—thus minimizing a 
significant barrier to access.136 Additionally, payers generally prefer 
discounts because they are much simpler to manage than the complex 
administration of other systems like pay for performance.137 
However, the implementation of discounts may still create 
problems for two reasons. First, discounts have been critiqued 
because, unlike pay-for-performance and indication-based pricing, 
the decreased costs are not associated with the value the treatment or 
drug carries.138 Thus, discounts do little to motivate treatment 
developers to improve the efficiency of their product. 
Second, for the extremely large payments of gene therapies, 
discounts are likely to be negotiated on a case-by-case—or at least a 
health-plan-by-health-plan—basis, if provided at all. Case-by-case 
negotiations place a lot of discretion with the developers to control 
who has access to the treatment. For example, StatNews recently 
published a story about two siblings in the Amish community who 
carry the specific gene mutation that Luxturna is approved to treat.139 
The catch is that the Amish community pools resources to pay for the 
community’s health needs—it does not have private insurance 
policies to cover even a portion of the expenses of gene therapy.140 
Additionally, since there are two children who would need the 
treatment in the community, the total cost would be $1.7 million.141 
The families are working with the maker of Luxturna, Spark 
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Therapeutics, to negotiate a discount for the drug, similar to that an 
insurer might get; although at the time of the story, the company was 
not willing to give any discounts.142 Here again, as with pay-for-
performance schemes, a larger payer or single-payer may be better 
able to negotiate discounts for their policyholders than individuals 
themselves or a smaller health plan.143 
4.  Reinsurance 
Pay-for-performance pricing, indication-based pricing, and 
discounts are all alternative payment systems that seek to lower the 
cost of treatment for at least some segment of the population—those 
whose treatment was ineffective, those disease or indication groups 
experiencing different treatment effectiveness, and those whose 
payers have negotiated reduced rates, respectively. Other alternative 
payment models seek to spread the cost across a broader risk pool. By 
spreading the risk of a high payment across a larger insurance pool, 
payers minimize the potential harm of having several high-cost 
payments within one plan year. For example, an insurance pool of ten 
people is much more likely to be impacted if one needs an $800,000 
treatment than an insurance pool of one hundred. Therefore, 
insurance companies can try to grow their risk pools—generally, they 
aim to increase the number of relatively healthy policyholders in their 
risk pool.144 
Alternatively, insurers can seek reinsurance as another way to 
spread their risk even without contracting with more policyholders. 
Reinsurance is effectively an insurance policy for the insurance 
company, which covers the risk of a high one-time payment.145 In this 
way, individual companies are protected against an unanticipated 
number of high payouts and spread the cost across what is effectively 
pooled risk for insurance companies.146 As a way to pool risk across 
insurances, reinsurance is an especially attractive solution in 
countries, like the United States, that have a fragmented health-care 
system.147 Reinsurance, however, is not necessarily expected to 
decrease costs since it reduces incentives for drug developers to lower 
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prices.148 Additionally, some reinsurers have explicitly begun to 
exclude gene therapies from their coverage.149 
5.  Annuity Payments 
Another proposed solution to high insurance payouts is to set up 
reimbursement as a series of payments over time, rather than require 
the full cost all at once.150 Called annuity payments, or alternatively 
amortization, these models would tend to make costs for an insurance 
company more consistent and less random.151 Such models have also 
been analogized to a home mortgage system—rather than pay for the 
good up front and reap the benefit for years to come, homeowners 
instead enter into mortgages to set costs over time and defray the 
initial up-front cost.152 Whereas reinsurance spreads cost across a 
greater number of people, annuity payments spread cost temporally. 
Annuity payments require an up-front loan that the patient or 
insurer then pays off over time—much like a mortgage company 
loaning the initial money to pay for the house.153 This loan could come 
from the treatment developer, a third-party financer, or a consumer 
loan, but some also suggest that it could be done through an initial 
government-issued loan.154 The annuity payment model can also be 
combined with a pay-for-performance model, where the annuity 
payments only continue as long as the treatment remains effective for 
the patient.155 Of course, similar, if not more complex, problems arise 
due to the long-term payment relationship between insurer, drug 
manufacturer, and patient. Questions of what happens when a patient 
switches insurance plans remain an issue,156 along with new questions 
of what happens if the payments go into default and what implications 
this would have to the overall cost of the system.157 
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Additionally, while annuities may help to bring gene therapies 
onto the market, they essentially push health-care costs down the 
road without effectively lowering costs.158 This may strain health-care 
budgets in the future and continue to threaten the health-care 
systems.159 
C. Patient Issues 
Even if innovative pricing models are adopted and work to lower 
the cost of new gene-editing treatments or to spread the expense 
temporally or across a broader risk pool, cost may still be an issue for 
patients—a perennial problem in our broken health-care system. For 
example, even with insurance coverage, out-of-pocket costs for gene-
editing treatments may be prohibitive for many individuals. 
Additionally, in a society where there is inequitable access to health 
insurance itself, there will be many people for whom reimbursement 
policies are irrelevant, and this problem will be magnified if changes 
to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) remove protections for 
preexisting conditions. Thus, it is foreseeable that cost will be a 
significant barrier to access as somatic gene-editing therapies enter 
clinical care.160 
1.  Out-of-Pocket Expenses 
For any large-cost treatment, out-of-pocket costs, such as co-pays 
and coinsurance, can prevent individuals from accessing care, even if 
that care is covered in part by insurance.161 Indeed, even small co-pays 
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can be a barrier to care—one of the reasons why the ACA included 
preventive care free of all out-of-pocket costs to policyholders.162 
High out-of-pocket costs can lead to disparities in access to care.163 
For example, in part due to the high costs associated with in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”), minorities and persons of low-to-middle 
socioeconomic status are less likely to get care for infertility.164 It is 
especially important to continue to consider out-of-pocket costs and 
barriers of access for patients because society could implement 
several innovative pricing systems described above but still not 
improve equitable access since innovative models will not help those 
that choose not to undergo a treatment due to out-of-pocket costs.165 
Out-of-pocket expenses are also a problem for those who do not 
have insurance coverage. As the example of the Amish seeking 
discounts for Luxturna highlights, individuals and even communities 
without insurance reimbursement can find the high costs of gene-
therapy treatments a significant barrier.166 Even for those with 
insurance coverage, getting access to high-cost gene-therapy 
treatments can be difficult.167 High out-of-pocket costs could prevent 
a patient from getting care or can necessitate finding other sources of 
money, such as from a crowdfunding website like GoFundMe.168 
Additionally, until therapies are covered by existing insurance 
policies, the new treatments will essentially have to be covered via 
self-pay.169 
2.  Preexisting Conditions 
Currently, individuals with genetic conditions are protected 
against discrimination in access to health insurance principally by two 
laws—the ACA and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(“GINA”). GINA prohibits health insurers from denying an 
individual health insurance based on genetic information, including 
genetic test results and family medical history.170 One catch, however, 
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is that GINA’s protections do not cover manifested symptoms, even if 
they have an underlying genetic cause.171 Enter the ACA, which 
prohibits health insurers from considering preexisting conditions and 
symptoms when determining insurance coverage and setting rates.172 
Protection for preexisting conditions is simultaneously one of the 
most popular provisions of the law and one of the most endangered.173 
For example, currently the Trump administration has declined to 
defend the ACA in an ongoing lawsuit that argues that the 
preexisting condition protections are unconstitutional.174 Given 
existing political threats to the preexisting condition protections of 
the ACA, it is worth noting how genetics in general and gene-editing 
treatments in particular may challenge the scope of protections 
provided by GINA were the ACA’s protections to disappear. 
If the preexisting condition clause of the ACA no longer applies, 
then GINA will return as the primary health insurance protection for 
individuals with gene-based risks and predispositions. However, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear distinction between a 
predisposition and a disease. For example, if a patient has a variant in 
a Lynch-Syndrome-associated gene that indicates that he or she is at 
increased risk for colon cancer, this alone would be protected genetic 
information.175 If the same patient developed colon cancer, this would 
be a manifested condition.176 But does the initiation of preventive 
measures, like screening for what doctors and genetic counselors 
identify as a “cancer predisposition syndrome,” indicate that what 
was a predisposition is now a disease? Does finding a polyp qualify as 
manifesting? Virtually every genetic condition not fully penetrant at 
birth poses some variant of this conundrum. 
GINA itself does not define “manifestation” of disease.177 
However, GINA’s regulations related to health insurance state that a 
disease is manifest when  
an individual has been or could reasonably be diagnosed with 
the disease, disorder, or pathological condition by a health care 
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professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field 
of medicine involved. For purposes of this section, a disease, 
disorder, or pathological condition is not manifest if a diagnosis 
is based principally on genetic information.178 
Gene-editing therapies will likely continue to blur the bounds 
between genotype and phenotype—that is, between a person’s genes 
and their actual self: the collection of features, characteristics, and 
tendencies that presents itself to the world. Indeed, with gene editing, 
it is the genotype itself that is the manifestation of disease being 
treated, sometimes in advance of any symptomology at all. Many 
potential gene-therapy targets, such as metabolic diseases, are 
progressive and show effects over time, although the genetic variant 
responsible for the disease could be identified in utero or at birth. In 
many scenarios, presymptomatic treatment may be one of the 
advantages of gene therapy, which could allow us to act before the 
disease inflicts damage that cannot be undone. For this reason, we 
emphasize the second part of the definition of manifestation in the 
regulations—that if a diagnosis is based principally on genetic 
information it is not considered a manifest condition. If this 
protection is lost (and without the ACA protections), and if clinical 
genetic testing and preventive gene-editing therapies become more 
mainstream, some people would be at risk of losing their health 
insurance simply because of their genetic makeup. 
Unfortunately, if the ACA protections are repealed, many 
individuals who could benefit from gene-therapy or gene-editing 
treatments could be denied coverage based on existing symptoms.179 
For example, without ACA protection, if an individual has been 
experiencing vision loss, a new individual insurance policy could deny 
the patient health insurance based on the preexisting condition or 
refuse to cover the cost of Luxturna due to a preexisting condition 
exclusion. While other insurance, such as Medicaid, may be an option 
(assuming that state Medicaid had opted to cover the expensive 
treatment), this would push more patients needing extremely 
expensive medical care into already stretched public systems rather 
than pooling risks throughout private and public insurance. Ideally, of 
course, both the protections of the ACA and GINA should remain in 
place in order to have continuity of protection across the murky 
boundary between genotype and phenotype. 
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IV.  ACCESS AND DISPARITIES 
Disparities in access to care are not unique to gene therapy; there 
is nothing new about health-care disparities. Other health-care 
treatments raise concerns related to high costs and one-time 
treatments. For example, Sovaldi, a treatment for Hepatitis C, costs 
as much as $84,000 for a twelve-week dose.180 However, it is still 
important to examine these issues in the gene-therapy space as 
treatments grow, given the social implications of having some able to 
access a cure and others left without the possibility to pay for desired 
treatment. 
The introduction of a powerful new class of high-priced therapies 
with the potential to considerably reduce the burden of inherited 
disease brings the issue to a new level. Obviously, anytime an 
individual is denied access to care it is lamentable. Systemically, it 
translates into something broader: an issue of social justice. 
We often see diseases where incidence as well as outcome are 
related to poverty, from cardiovascular disease to tropical diseases 
such as dengue fever.181 Systematic analysis has shown that diseases 
that occur primarily in low-income populations are less likely to be 
the focus of research and pharmaceutical development.182 Examples 
like malaria and tuberculosis generally expose differences between 
developing and developed nations; gene therapy has the potential to 
divide the population of a given nation into at-risk and not-at-risk 
subcultures. How this affects the division of health and community 
resources remains to be seen, but an ebbing of empathic or self-
interest-based motivation for controlling diseases is one possible 
result. 
As a policy statement from the American Society of Human 
Genetics (“ASHG”) puts it,  
Unequal access and cultural differences affecting uptake could 
create large differences in the relative incidence of a given 
condition by region, ethnic group, or socioeconomic status. 
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Genetic disease, once a universal common denominator, could 
instead become an artifact of class, geographic location, and 
culture.183  
In this instance the ASHG working group was discussing changes to 
the human germline—eggs, sperm, or embryos184—but the point is 
relevant to somatic treatments as well. A treatment that is an 
effective cure for some and not others could adversely affect our 
willingness to find funds for resources and care to help those who 
remain affected, as well as funding for research into less glamorous 
but more affordable conventional treatments.185 
No one likes to imagine that there could be a lack of empathy for 
individuals without access to care, but both health-care and research 
dollars are finite and competitive. It is easier to imagine an empathy 
deficit when the community-building aspect of our shared risk is no 
longer in play. It has the potential to increase the sort of stigma often 
discussed by advocates for disability rights who described how 
affected individuals can be viewed as “other.”186 “Genetic disease has 
always been our shared vulnerability. When one part of society can 
opt out of risk, will they continue to feel the same obligation to 
provide support and resources to those who remain [vulnerable] 
.	.	.	?”187 
This is not to say that everyone should undergo gene therapy—
there are some who may choose not to get this treatment for a myriad 
of valid reasons.188 Nor is this necessarily where society’s limited 
health-care dollars should be focused. However, as these technologies 
are inevitably rolled into clinical care, there are problematic 
implications if only those with independent funding are able to cure 
disease. Currently, this lack of access affects only a handful of 
individuals as somatic gene-therapy treatment reaches a small patient 
population. However, as gene-therapy offerings grow, so too will the 
impact for those left out of the system due to cost. Now, at the dawn 
of gene therapy, is a ripe time to consider both access and cost. 
 
 183. Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM. 
GENETICS 167, 172 (2017). 
 184. See id.  
 185. See id.; Laura Hercher, Innovations in Prenatal Testing and the Ghettoization of 
Genetic Disease (July 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina 
Law Review). 
 186. Aisling de Paor & Peter Blanck, Precision Medicine and Advancing Genetic 
Technologies—Disability and Human Rights Perspectives, 5 LAWS 1, 8 (2016). 
 187. Hercher, supra note 185.  
 188. Ormond et al., supra note 183, at 171. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1463 (2019) 
2019] FIELD OF DREAMS 1495 
CONCLUSION 
Gene therapy will never be the underlying cause of health-care 
inequities; access to care is a systemic issue within our health-care 
system. However, gene therapy threatens to exacerbate existing 
disparities in substantial ways. Generally, though this may not be true 
in every instance, there are three characteristics of gene therapy that 
have social justice implications: they are extremely expensive as a 
one-time cost, they are intended as a cure rather than a treatment or 
risk-reducing measure, and they are specific to a given genotype. 
Successful applications of gene therapy with limited access will not 
just improve outcomes for individuals who receive the intervention 
but essentially create a class of persons who are at risk for these 
diseases and a class of persons who are not. And while success for the 
early adopters who have insurance or can self-pay may pave the way 
for others down the road, the individualized nature of gene therapy is 
such that scale or practice may not radically bring the prices down, as 
has often been the case with other innovations. 
Our recommendation, therefore, is for the importance of 
equitable access. Access can be improved either by increasing 
reimbursement or decreasing costs, and greater equality of access will 
no doubt require both. Because insurers are not incentivized to pay 
for expensive one-time therapies under our current system, we will 
need to consider a variety of alternative payment systems that lower 
costs, reduce uncertainties relative to value, and create a broader pool 
of shared risk. 
The advent of successful gene therapy is a long-sought goal of 
medical research and may prove to be a blessing for many families 
affected by genetic disease. The economics of gene therapy, however, 
are challenging and may reduce access for broad swaths of the 
population. Without a commitment to ensuring access, gene therapy 
may fail to live up to its potential. Individuals may be unable to pay 
for treatment or denied it because their disease is too rare or their 
prognosis is too uncertain to make gene therapy economically viable. 
In consequence, we run the risk of creating a world of haves and 
have-nots and that those who cannot find the means of obtaining 
treatment face more in the way of stigma with less in the way of 
resources and support. For all of these reasons, the success of gene 




97 N.C. L. REV. 1463 (2019) 
1496 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
 
 
 
